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CAN  A  “MERE  EMPLOYEE”  STOP  YOU  FROM
VAPING?:  THE  APPOINTMENTS  CLAUSE
APPLIED  TO  RULEMAKERS
Melinda Holmes*
INTRODUCTION
Agencies wield immense power today that the Framers of the Constitu-
tion could not have imagined when contemplating the existence of depart-
ments within the executive branch.  The receding tide of public opinion
regarding the trustworthiness of agencies brought with it an increased focus
on methods available to check agency action, including hiring requirements
for officers under the Appointments Clause.  The constitutional methods of
appointing officers—presidential appointment with Senate advice and con-
sent, and sole appointment by the President, heads of departments, or courts
of the United States—enable the public to hold the political branches
accountable for those officers, who are able to exercise authority in govern-
ance, and protect the separation of powers among the branches.
The question that follows is: Who is an officer requiring one of these
constitutionally designated modes of appointment?  It is a question that has
been placed before the Supreme Court time and again. Lucia v. SEC, the
most recent Supreme Court case on the subject, held that the SEC’s adminis-
trative law judges (ALJs) are officers but left open important questions about
how the Appointments Clause and the Lucia holding might apply in other
contexts.1  Among those are agency decisionmakers who are not ALJs, such
as those who sign their names to rulemaking documents.
A group of cases percolating in the lower courts and consolidated in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia present the issue of officer
status in the rulemaking context.  They offer an opportunity to clarify who is
an “officer” without the striking similarity to facts that a precedent case like
Lucia had to Freytag v. Commissioner, which held that special trial judges
(STJs) appointed by the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court are
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Bachelor of Science,
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2017.  I am grateful to Professor Emily Bremer
for her guidance throughout the writing and revision process and Professor William Kelley
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1 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018).
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officers.2 Hoban v. FDA, Moose Jooce v. FDA, and Rave Salon v. FDA challenge
the Deeming Rule, which was issued by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) under the signature of an individual who was not appointed by one of
the constitutionally required methods for officers.3  These cases present a
novel question and an opportunity to further develop the law defining who is
an “officer.”
This Note analyzes whether actors discharging the rulemaking function
of an agency are officers and discusses whether persons not appointed pursu-
ant to the Appointments Clause can constitutionally exercise such power.
Part I examines the development of the doctrine over time leading to Lucia.
Part II presents possible frameworks for challenges following Lucia.  Part III
traces delegation of authority from Congress to the agency and from senior
agency officials to the individual who actually exercises the delegated author-
ity.  In doing so, it explores how the framework should apply in the rulemak-
ing context, focusing on the example presented by litigation challenging the
promulgation of the FDA Deeming Rule.
Formally adhering to the demands of the Constitution, which ensures
that the lines of accountability within the executive branch remain clear and
unobscured, has value in itself.  In practice, the FDA Deeming Rule can sat-
isfy the demands of the Appointments Clause merely by having an officer
who was appointed in one of the manners prescribed by that Clause formally
promulgate the rule.  However, the import of that action is the strengthening
of political accountability of agencies to the President, particularly in an
agency that does not enjoy independence and instead is directly under the
control of the President.  Thus, formal adherence to the Appointments
Clause is essential for the proper balance in our separation of powers, even if,
in reality, the solution is merely a different person’s signature on the rule.
When regulating the safety of e-cigarettes and vaping,4 it is important
that these regulations are promulgated under the proper authority within
the FDA.
I. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE HISTORY AND PRECEDENT—“OFFICER” VERSUS
“MERE EMPLOYEE”
The Appointments Clause fulfills important purposes in maintaining the
balance of power among the branches of government and promoting good
2 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 870, 882 (1991).
3 Complaint at 1, Hoban v. FDA, No. 18-cv-00269 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2018) [hereinaf-
ter Complaint, Hoban]; Complaint at 1, Moose Jooce v. FDA, No. 1:18-cv-00203 (D.D.C.
Jan. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Complaint, Moose Jooce]; Complaint at 1, Rave Salon v. FDA, No.
3:18-cv-00237 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Complaint, Rave Salon].  These cases
have been consolidated in Moose Jooce.
4 See, e.g., Lung Illnesses Associated with Use of Vaping Products, FDA (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/public-health-focus/lung-illnesses-associated-use-vaping-
products; see also Sheila Kaplan & Matt Richtel, The Mysterious Vaping Illness That’s ‘Becoming
an Epidemic,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/health/
vaping-marijuana-ecigarettes-sickness.html.
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governance by increasing transparency and accountability.  It blends the
power of appointing officers between the President and Congress and limits
congressional delegation of authority to the executive branch.  The text of
the Constitution divides this power, stating that the President shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, . . . but the Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads
of Departments.5
Two key distinctions exist within the Appointments Clause doctrine.
The first distinction, between officers and nonofficer employees, is at issue in
this Note and is expanded on below.  Whether the official in question is an
officer or a nonofficer employee determines whether the Appointments
Clause applies at all to the hiring of that particular individual.  When the
individual’s position is that of a “mere employee,” there is no constitutional
significance to how he or she got the job.6
The second distinction, between principal officers and inferior officers,
sprung from the two different modes of appointment set out by the Appoint-
ments Clause itself.  For principal officers, only one mode of appointment is
available: presidential appointment subject to advice and consent by the Sen-
ate.  This can be considered the default for all officers, as inferior officers
may also be appointed in this manner, though it is not mandatory.7  The
other mode of appointment needs no Senate participation—only the Presi-
dent, the courts, or a department head is required to appoint these officers.
This mode is only available to inferior officers, though they may be
appointed using either mode.8  In either case, the appointment must be by
law, and Congress decides the mode.
These differences in mode of appointment—particularly the blending
and checking of powers involved in the first and not the second—balance the
conflicting values of efficiency and accountability.9  Over time, the Supreme
Court has developed the doctrine that distinguishes principal and inferior
officers.10  In Morrison v. Olson, the Court held the independent counsel was
an inferior officer,11 though at the same time recognizing that the line
between inferior and principal officer was “far from clear” and even stating
that the Court “need not attempt here to decide exactly where the line falls
5 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
6 John T. Plecnik, Officers Under the Appointments Clause, 11 PITT. TAX REV. 201, 203
(2014) (“[E]mployees may be hired by any arm of government.”).
7 See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 189–90, 205–16 (7th ed. 2018).
8 Id.
9 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“This alterna-
tive process for appointing inferior officers strikes a balance between efficiency and
accountability.”).
10 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
11 Id. at 659–60, 671.
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between the two types of officers,” given that the independent counsel was
clearly an inferior officer.12  Instead of providing a definitive test, Morrison
identified several factors that set out the position of independent counsel as
inferior rather than principal: it was “subject to removal by a higher Execu-
tive Branch official,” authorized to exercise “certain, limited duties,” and
“limited in jurisdiction.”13  This opened the door for the Court to later
define the line more clearly.14  Justice Scalia dissented in Morrison, arguing
that separation of powers principles should be the first consideration and,
when properly considered, required the opposite decision to “preserve the
equilibrium the Constitution sought to establish.”15  Nearly a decade later, in
Edmond v. United States, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court,16 filling in the gap
left by Morrison when it had declined to prescribe a definitive test for the line
between inferior and principal officers under the Appointments Clause.17  In
Edmond, the Court pointed to the level of supervision of an officer as a rele-
vant consideration: “Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether
he has a superior.”18  Under this test, an inferior officer is one “whose work is
directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presi-
dential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”19  Following
Edmond, the test applied by courts to determine the proper mode of appoint-
ment under the Appointments Clause has been relatively clear and steady.
But the same cannot be said for the test for officers and nonofficer
employees.
The test distinguishing officers from nonofficer employees remains
largely unsettled.  Challenges in this area arise when a government official is
claimed to be a nonofficer employee and is “accused of unconstitutionally
12 Id. at 671.
13 Id. at 671–72.
14 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
15 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The statuses of both the indepen-
dent and special counsels have received significant attention over the years. See, e.g., Brett
M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2135–36 (1998)
(arguing that the independent counsel is a principal officer and appointment by advice
and consent would provide “greater public credibility and moral authority”).  Recently,
Robert Mueller’s position as special counsel has been questioned as to whether or not he is
a principal officer who only could have been constitutionally appointed with advice and
consent. See VICTORIA NOURSE, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, MORRISON
V. OLSON, AND THE DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY 1, 7
(2018), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/UnitaryExecutiveThe-
ory.pdf; Steven G. Calabresi, Mueller’s Investigation Crosses the Legal Line, WALL ST. J. (May
13, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/muellers-investigation-crosses-the-legal-line-
1526233750; George Conway, The Terrible Arguments Against the Constitutionality of the Mueller
Investigation, LAWFARE (June 11, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/terrible-arguments-
against-constitutionality-mueller-investigation.
16 Edmond, 520 U.S. 651.
17 Id. at 661 (“Morrison did not purport to set forth a definitive test for whether an
office is ‘inferior’ under the Appointments Clause.”).
18 Id. at 662.
19 Id. at 663.
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wielding the more significant authority of an Officer.”20  In the most recent
Supreme Court case on the question, Lucia v. SEC, the Court laid out a two-
step framework for determining whether the administrative law judges at
issue were officers.21  First, were the positions continuing?22  Second, did
they exercise significant authority under the law?23  It is within this second
part of the test that the law remains unclear and leaves lingering questions as
to who exactly is an officer of the United States.
A. Development of the Doctrine
The history of the Supreme Court’s Appointments Clause doctrine
illuminates the background on which Lucia was decided.  Chief Justice Mar-
shall, riding the circuit, described an officer as one in “‘a public charge or
employment’ . . . on the part of the United States” performing a “continuing”
duty.24  Later, in United States v. Hartwell, the Court also referred to an office
as being a “public station, or employment, conferred by the appointment of
government” and “embrac[ing] the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument,
and duties.”25  Hearkening back to Hartwell, the Court in United States v. Ger-
maine concluded that the individual in question was not an officer within the
meaning of the Appointments Clause based on his “tenure, duration, emolu-
ment, and duties.”26  Of particular import to the Court was that the individ-
ual’s duties were not “continuing and permanent,” but rather were
“occasional and intermittent.”27
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court specified, for the first time, the
requirement that an officer exercise significant authority.28  The Court speci-
fied that “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States is an ‘Officer of the United States.’”29  Elaborating on
the facts of the case at hand, the Court noted that the administrative powers
bestowed on the Federal Election Commission by Congress included
“rulemaking, advisory opinions, and determinations of eligibility for funds
and . . . for federal elective office itself” without supervision by Congress or
the executive branch and that “each of these functions also represents the
20 Plecnik, supra note 6, at 203.
21 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018)
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747); see
E. Garrett West, Clarifying the Employee-Officer Distinction in Appointments Clause Jurisprudence,
127 YALE L.J.F. 42, 46–47 (2017).
25 United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1868).
26 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879) (citing Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) at 393).
27 Id. at 512.
28 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam) (“We think its fair import is
that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States is an ‘Officer of the United States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner
prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article.”).
29 Id.
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performance of a significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a pub-
lic law.”30
B. The Doctrine Today
Freytag v. Commissioner involved the organization of the U.S. Tax Court,
an adjudicatory Article I court.  The questions before the Supreme Court
were whether special trial judges were officers and whether their appoint-
ment by the Chief Judge of the Tax Court violated the Appointments
Clause.31
The Court held that the STJs were officers and identified several factors
leading to that conclusion.  The office was established by law, and “the duties,
salary, and means of appointment for that office are specified by statute.”32
It did not matter that they could not enter a final decision.  STJs performed
“more than ministerial tasks” and “exercise[d] significant discretion.”33  Even
if some of the tasks performed could be performed by an employee, that
does not change the status of an inferior officer, according to the Court.34
Thus, the STJs were inferior officers.  The Court further held that the statute
granting the Chief Judge the authority to hire the STJs did not violate the
Appointments Clause because the Chief Judge was one of the “Courts of
Law” under Article II.35
Two terms back, the Court heard another Appointments Clause case.
The issue in Lucia v. SEC was whether the SEC administrative law judges were
officers. Lucia laid out a two-step framework to determine who are officers.36
The first question is whether the position is “continuing.”37  Citing United
States v. Germaine, the Court retained the distinction between a position that
is “occasional or temporary” and one that is “continuing and permanent.”38
If a position is “occasional or temporary,” the individual who holds it is a
mere employee, not an officer.39  Second, drawing language from Buckley v.
Valeo, the individual must “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States.”40
While the Court acknowledged that there is a need for further elabora-
tion of the significant authority test to serve as guidance in the future, articu-
lating that “maybe one day [it] will see a need to refine or enhance the test,”
it declined to address that topic, instead finding that Freytag made any further
30 Id. at 140–41.
31 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991).
32 Id. at 881.
33 Id. at 881–82.
34 Id. at 882.
35 Id. at 888–92.
36 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018).
37 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879).
38 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051 (quoting Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511–12).
39 Id.
40 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam)).
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elaboration unnecessary.41  The Court found the ALJs at issue in Lucia were
“near-carbon copies” of the STJs in Freytag, whom that Court found to be
officers.42  Viewing Freytag through the framework laid out above, it gave an
overview of the decision, pointing out that the Court there first found the
STJs to be a continuing office established by law and, second, that the STJs
wielded significant authority.43
Following that was a fact-by-fact comparison of the ALJs to the STJs
according to the factors considered by the Freytag Court.  As the Court
acknowledged, “Freytag says everything necessary to decide this case.”44  First,
the position of an ALJ is also a continuing office established by law.45  There
was no dispute on this point, so the Court turned its attention to the question
of significant authority.  It found that the “ALJs exercise the same ‘significant
discretion’ when carrying out the same ‘important functions’ as STJs do.”46
It pointed to four powers Freytag mentioned with respect to the authority in
ensuring “fair and orderly adversarial hearings.”47  They take testimony, con-
duct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have power to enforce
compliance with discovery orders.48  The Court found a difference between
the positions in terms of the independence of the decisions issued.  While a
major decision by the STJs always requires review by a Tax Court judge,
major decisions by ALJs do not have the same mandatory review by the SEC.
The SEC may choose not to review, in which case the ALJ’s decision is final.49
As the Court did not find any suggestions of relevant distinctions convincing,
it held that ALJs are officers.50
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice Gorsuch
joined, agreeing with the outcome of the case but arguing that further gui-
dance can be found in the original public meaning regarding what makes
someone an officer.51  In support of his position, he cited extensively to Jen-
nifer Mascott’s article Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, which provides a
detailed originalist account in answering that question.52  Justice Thomas—
in alignment with Professor Mascott’s thesis—stated that “[t]he Founders
likely understood the term ‘Officers of the United States’ to encompass all
41 Id. at 2052.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 2053.
45 Id.
46 Id. (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991)).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 2054.
50 Id. at 2055.
51 Id. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).
52 Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443
(2018).
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federal civil officials who perform an ongoing, statutory duty—no matter how
important or significant the duty.”53
Justice Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.54  While he agreed that the ALJs were improperly appointed, he found
a violation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) rather than the
Constitution.55  The APA provides that “[e]ach agency shall appoint as many
administrative law judges as are necessary for” hearings under the APA.56
Justice Breyer argued that the APA gives the Commission the authority to
appoint ALJs, not the Commission’s staff.57  Because the APA does not give
the Commission the authority to delegate its power of appointment, the
appointment of ALJs in this case violated the APA.58  With statutory grounds
on which to find this unlawful, Justice Breyer would have the Court exercise
judicial restraint and “decide no more than that.”59
He further explained his reasons for not expanding the Court’s defini-
tion of officer.  The Court found in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB that for
Congress to provide more than one level of protection to officers from
removal, it would violate the separation of powers by impermissibly limiting
the President’s authority.60  If Free Enterprise Fund applies to ALJs, it impli-
cates their independence in decisionmaking, a feature that has been long
protected through such removal restrictions.61  While there has been criti-
cism generally of an ALJ’s ability to truly operate independently pre-Lucia,
the Lucia holding, combined with Free Enterprise Fund, suggests that either the
current ALJ structure is unconstitutional or that ALJs must enjoy much less
independence than they currently have. Justice Breyer provided some com-
fort in this by referring to the Free Enterprise Fund Court’s discussion of how
ALJs can be distinguished from the board members at issue in that case.62
Lucia went no further than Freytag and thus obviated the need for the
Court to elaborate on the relevant standard.  Professor Mascott has suggested
that Lucia shut down an interpretive approach followed in Freytag and
Tucker.63  Those cases suggested that the exercise of discretionary authority
53 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).  This understanding would
potentially eliminate one of the two prongs of the Court’s analysis in Lucia or provide the
basis for the significant authority definition.
54 Id. at 2057 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55 Id. at 2057.
56 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
57 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2058 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58 Id. 2058–59
59 Id. at 2059.
60 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 514 (2010).
61 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2060 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“[T]o hold that the administrative law judges are ‘Officers of the United States’ is, perhaps,
to hold that their removal protections are unconstitutional.”).
62 Id. at 2060–61.
63 Jennifer Mascott, Symposium: The Appointments Clause—A Modest Take, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 22, 2018, 3:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-the-appoint
ments-clause-a-modest-take/.
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and final decisionmaking power were mandatory in order to find that the
individual is an officer. Lucia did not appear to make the presence of those
factors mandatory, though they may still be relevant considerations.  Justice
Thomas’s concurrence interpreted the Court’s move in that way, stating
those factors could be sufficient but not necessary for an officer.  Following
Lucia, courts attempting to apply the proper standard can be confident that
the office must be continuing, but what is required by the second prong—
exercising significant authority—remains unsettled.64
II. WHO IS AN OFFICER AFTER LUCIA?
Lucia laid out a two-step framework for a court to determine who are
officers.65  The first requirement is that the position is “continuing.”66  Sec-
ond, the individual must “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the
laws of the United States.”67  Despite the apparent clarity of a two-prong anal-
ysis, this configuration leaves substantial room for interpretation, since the
Court has not yet applied it in a case without precedent directly on point.  As
Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurring opinion in Lucia, “this Court
will not be able to decide every Appointments Clause case by comparing it to
Freytag.”68  Indeed, the Court itself acknowledged that “maybe one day [the
Court] will see a need to refine or enhance the test.”69  There are three ways
in which the Court may resolve the uncertainty arising from the “significant
authority” prong in the future: defining “significant authority” narrowly,
defining it broadly, or overturning Lucia’s two-prong analysis entirely in favor
of the officer test suggested by the original public meaning—a “continuing,
statutory duty.”  Section II.A briefly addresses the first prong of the Lucia
framework.  Next, Section II.B discusses the narrow interpretation of signifi-
cant authority.  Section II.C then considers both a broad construction of sig-
nificant authority and the alternative definition of officer status according to
the original public meaning, noting that the two approaches may lead to a
similar result on the issue of officer status.
A. Continuing and Permanent
The “continuing” prong of the officer analysis of Lucia is straightfor-
ward.  Citing United States v. Germaine, the Court retained the distinction
between a position that is “occasional or temporary” and one that is “continu-
64 This discussion does not attempt to resolve the next natural question: Are they prin-
cipal or inferior officers?  For discussion of a case regarding whether ALJs are principal
officers, see Constitutionality of PTAB Judge Appointments Challenged in Polaris IPR Appeal,
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.foley.com/constitutionality-of-ptab-
judge-appointments-challenged-in-polaris-ipr-appeal-08-03-2018/.
65 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2051.
66 Id. (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879)).
67 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam)).
68 Id. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 2052 (majority opinion).
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ing and permanent.”70  If a position is “occasional or temporary,” the individ-
ual who holds it is a mere employee, not an officer.71
B. Narrow Interpretation of Significant Authority
The first interpretation of “significant authority” is a narrow one, of
which Justice Sotomayor and Justice Ginsburg are proponents.  Justice
Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented in Lucia, addressing the fact
that the Court has not yet articulated what it means to be an officer of the
United States.72  Following the Court’s two-prong framework, Justice
Sotomayor elaborated on the meaning of the significant authority require-
ment from Buckley.  Under her interpretation, to be considered an officer
under the Appointments Clause, that individual must have “the ability to
make final, binding decisions on behalf of the Government.”73  One who
“merely advises and provides recommendations to an officer would not her-
self qualify as an officer.”74  She called upon Free Enterprise Fund in support of
this position.75  There, the Court stated in dicta that at least ninety percent of
individuals who “render services to the Federal Government and are paid by
it are not constitutional officers.”76  Some historical documents were also
cited for support.77  Given this structure requiring officers to exercise final
decisionmaking authority, the ALJs at issue in Lucia were not officers, Justice
Sotomayor concluded.78  This would be consistent with Freytag because, in
that case, the STJs “in at least some instances [could] issue final decisions
that bind the Government or third parties.”79
In his Lucia opinion, Justice Breyer also called for a narrow interpreta-
tion, describing the consequences of a broad conception of “officer” as acute
and far reaching.80  If the Court were to accept the original public meaning
70 Id. at 2051 (citing Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511–12).
71 Id.




76 Id. (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 506
n.9 (2010)).
77 Id. (referring to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in 1822, which stated the
meaning of “office” implied delegation of sovereign power which binds the rights of
others, and a House Judiciary Committee Report in 1899 that discussed creation of an
office that involves delegation of sovereign functions).
78 Id. at 2067.
79 Id.  It should be noted that the distinction between “office” and “officer” was left
explicitly unanswered by the Court in Lucia. See United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
385, 393 (1868) (discussing employment in an “office” in terms of “continuing and perma-
nent” duties, not significant authority). But see United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510
(1879) (“That all persons who can be said to hold an office . . . under the Constitution
were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes of appointment
there can be but little doubt.”).
80 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2064.
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as the definition of “officer” in the Appointments Clause, it would implicate
more than administrative law judges.
A narrow definition without the finality requirement featured in Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion could be one “vested with the authority to alter legal
rights and obligations on behalf of the United States.”81  Either way, under a
narrow definition of “significant authority,” an officer’s status depends on a
factual analysis of her job responsibilities.
C. Comparing a Broad Interpretation to the Original Public Meaning
A broad conception of “significant authority” would find this prong satis-
fied where the officer performs a statutory duty.  Performing a “statutory
duty” clarifies the “significant authority” requirement to mean any duty estab-
lished by statute.  It draws from the original meaning, which, if fully
embraced, would abrogate the two prongs from Lucia entirely.
There has been a call by some scholars to return to the original public
meaning of “officer.”  Professor Mascott suggests the original public meaning
is significantly broader than any definition up to this point.82  An officer is
“one whom the government entrusts with ongoing responsibility to perform a
statutory duty of any level of importance.”83  This means that any individual
who carries out a task Congress assigned to the agency is an officer.  In the
massive administrative state today, with the high levels of subdelegation
within an agency discussed above, the adoption of this broad definition of
officer would send shockwaves throughout the current system.  Professor
Mascott’s proposition could be viewed as an abrogation of the current signifi-
cant authority requirement in favor of a new “duty-related standard,” which
would look to whether the officer had continuing duties (in line with the
modern doctrine’s first prong) and whether those duties were imposed by
statute.84
However, Professor Mascott acknowledges that it is possible to “return to
the eighteenth century statutory duty standard” while remaining “consistent
with Supreme Court case law, in substance even if not in form.”85  In this way,
the Court may remain loyal to precedent without compromising the protec-
tion the Constitution mandates here by framing the original public meaning
definition—a continuing, statutory duty—in terms of the modern framework
that focuses on continuing position and exercising significant authority.
When the Court clarifies the standard by which courts determine whether
81 West, supra note 24, at 44 (emphasis omitted).
82 Mascott, supra note 52, at 453–54.  This Note accepts Professor Mascott’s account
for this comparison among the significant authority definitions.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 463–64; Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. in Support of Petitioners at
18, Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (No. 17-130) [hereinafter Brief for Pac. Legal Found.] (“But the
duties need not be significant.”).
85 Mascott, supra note 52, at 465; cf.  Brief for Pac. Legal Found., supra note 84, at 23
(“[I]t is possible to read Buckley as saying that ‘significant authority’ means ‘sovereign
authority.’”).
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individuals are officers (as it inevitably must), it may adhere to its doctrinal
development of a two-prong approach and simply clarify that the “significant
authority” the Buckley Court presented is aligned with the longstanding
requirement that officers exercise a statutory duty.  This is not far-fetched
when one considers that the government, in its ordinary functioning, already
exercises immense power over others.86 Buckley itself concluded that the
Framers understood the term “‘Officers of the United States’ . . . to embrace
all appointed officials exercising responsibility under the public laws of the
Nation.”87  It may be understood to alter the formula without “intention to
break with the longstanding understanding of a public office or fashion a
new term of art.”88
This raises the question of the most recent discussion and application of
the “significant authority” requirement in Freytag and Lucia.  Acknowledging
that Freytag’s application of the Buckley standard may diverge from the origi-
nal meaning of “officer,” Professor Mascott suggests that it may not be “irrec-
oncilably inconsistent with the historic officer standard,” as one can interpret
that opinion as expressing merely sufficient factors for finding an officer
rather than requirements.89  This logic can be carried over to the Court’s
treatment of the Buckley standard in Lucia through the lens of Freytag.
Professor Mascott is not alone in her call to the original public meaning.
She and other scholars have pointed to early Supreme Court cases on the
subject supporting this broader definition of officer as the original under-
standing of the role.90  Citing United States v. Hartwell, a case decided in 1868,
the Court in United States v. Germaine in 1879 stated that the term officer
“embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties.”91  It found
dispositive the defendant’s lack of continuing and permanent duties in con-
cluding that he was not an officer.92
Joining these scholars in support of this original public meaning of
officers were Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch, as Professor Mascott’s work
was cited repeatedly in Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Lucia.93
Acknowledging the lack of clarity for what criteria are necessary to consider
someone an officer under the Appointments Clause, Justice Thomas argued
that this determination should be based on the original public meaning—“all
86 Mascott, supra note 52, at 464 (“The federal government, in exercising authority
over private parties, inherently wields so much power that, arguably, anyone carrying out a
statutory duty necessarily exercises ‘significant authority’ in some sense.”).
87 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 128–31 (1976) (per curiam).
88 Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31
Op. O.L.C. 73, 86 (2007).
89 Mascott, supra note 52, at 465.
90 See Brief for Pac. Legal. Found., supra note 84 at 15–29; Mascott, supra note 52, at
463–64; West, supra note 24, at 46–49.
91 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879).
92 Id. at 512.
93 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056–57 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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federal civil officials ‘with responsibility for an ongoing statutory duty.’”94
Within the original public meaning, the “significant authority” requirement
of Buckley v. Valeo would mean something slightly different from how it
sounds because it would include those who “perform an ongoing, statutory
duty—no matter how important or significant the duty.”95  Justice Thomas
did not discuss what this means for the Freytag and Lucia framework.  He
framed precedent as showing “what is sufficient . . . [but not] what is neces-
sary.”96  Perhaps significant authority is obviously sufficient because such
authority would clearly meet the low threshold under the original public
meaning.  Alternatively, Justice Thomas can be read as intending to over-
throw the entire framework set forth thus far, now requiring courts to answer
this one question: Does this individual perform an ongoing, statutory duty?
Without a clear answer from the Court, this could very well be the definition
of the future.  However, recognizing that the Court does not always follow
Justice Thomas’s lead in support of original public meaning, other defini-
tions have the potential to emerge in clarifying the “significant authority”
requirement of an officer under the Appointments Clause.
If the Constitution requires one of the two permissible modes of
appointment under the Appointments Clause for individuals who in any
capacity perform a continuous, statutory duty, the implications could be far
reaching, as noted by Justice Breyer in Lucia.  It would include actors, at all
levels, performing an agency’s adjudication and rulemaking functions, as
both are triggered by statute.  As discussed in Part III below, it would impact
individuals far down on an agency’s organization chart who are empowered
through subdelegations, flowing from the statute to the agency and from
department head to other individuals.  Each individual position in an agency
would need to be categorized—principal officers, inferior officers, and non-
officer employees—at the outset, before hiring, in order to ensure the
proper constitutional procedure is followed.  The problems may include
exacerbation of bureaucratic sluggishness, tightening the funnel for hiring
the majority of individuals because it would require the department head to
formally hire each one.  It would in turn promote the values the Appoint-
ments Clause generally protects.  It would clarify the line of accountability for
every agency action, no matter how far down the chain.  The politically
accountable department head—and formally, the President—would be
incentivized to choose (or put into place a system that selects) the most quali-
fied candidates and to exercise greater control over the agency’s actions at
every level.  An increase in inconvenience does not alter the constitutional
94 Id. (quoting NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
95 Id. at 2056.
96 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL310.txt unknown Seq: 14 28-FEB-20 13:02
1412 notre dame law review [vol. 95:3
analysis.97  In the Appointments Clause context, the Framers contemplated
difficulties and accounted for them in the Clause itself.98
III. APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO RULEMAKING OFFICIALS:
FDA DEEMING RULE
After Lucia, it remains the case that the further the individual at ques-
tion is from an analogous officer, the more uncertain the current Appoint-
ments Clause analysis becomes.  Significant work has been done regarding
the appointment of ALJs99 and the appointment of independent or special
counsel,100 and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has developed primarily
in those contexts.  Less has been said about the appointment of officers in
other contexts, namely those involved in rulemaking.  The unique aspects of
a rulemaking official’s role must affect the determination of whether such an
official is an officer.  These are explored below through the application of
the current doctrine and its possible conceptions to the real example of the
FDA Deeming Rule, which has been challenged on Appointments Clause
grounds.
A. FDA Deeming Rule
The Food and Drug Administration has not always had the power to
regulate tobacco, as surprising as it may seem, given the extent of its antis-
moking—and now, antivaping—campaign.  The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA), passed in 1938 and amended in 1996, gives the FDA the author-
ity to regulate “drugs” and “devices.”101  It defines “drug” as “articles (other
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.”102
The FDA interpreted “drug” to include nicotine, which served as its basis for
regulating tobacco products in order to reduce use by minors.103  These reg-
97 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
98 See United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879) (“[F]oreseeing that when
offices became numerous, and sudden removals necessary, this mode might be inconve-
nient, it was provided that, in regard to officers inferior to those specially mentioned, Con-
gress might by law vest their appointment in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in
the heads of departments.”).
99 See, e.g., Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandry, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797 (2013); Jen-
nifer L. Mascott, Constitutionally Conforming Agency Adjudication, 2 LOY. U. CHI. J. REG. COM-
PLIANCE 22 (2017); Jackson C. Blais, Note, Mischief Managed? The Unconstitutionality of SEC
ALJs Under the Appointments Clause, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115 (2018).
100 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Why Robert Mueller’s Appointment as Spe-
cial Counsel Was Unlawful, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 87 (2019); Kavanaugh, supra note 15, at
2135–36 (arguing that the independent counsel is a principal officer and appointment by
advice and consent would provide “greater public credibility and moral authority”);
Nourse, supra note 15, at 1, 7.
101 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)–(h), 393 (1994).  The FDA’s general authority goes back much
further than this, though. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000).
102 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
103 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 131.
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ulations were challenged in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., where
the issue was whether the FDA had the authority to regulate tobacco prod-
ucts.104  Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, holding FDA lacked
the authority to regulate tobacco products under the FDCA because it found
that Congress “clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regu-
late tobacco products.”105
Nine years later, Congress empowered the FDA to regulate the tobacco
industry through the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
(TCA).106  Under this Act, the FDA has authority to regulate to promote pub-
lic health, for example, prohibiting sales to minors, sales in publicly available
vending machines, tobacco-brand sponsorships of social or cultural events
like sports, and free giveaways of tobacco products and promotional items.107
The FDA’s power to regulate the tobacco industry is undisputed under this
law.
Disputes have arisen under a particular administrative action—the
Deeming Rule.  In 2016, the FDA issued a rule to regulate all tobacco prod-
ucts.108  The Deeming Rule extends the FDA’s regulations to cover all
tobacco products within the statutory definition, including e-cigarettes and
vaporizers.109  According to the FDA, this rule regulates all tobacco products,
requires health warnings on certain new products, bans free samples,
requires that new products meet the applicable public health standard and
receive marketing authorization from the FDA, prohibits sales to minors,
requires photo ID verification, and prohibits tobacco products sold in vend-
ing machines that are generally available.110  This is the foundation for FDA
tobacco-related actions.
The Deeming Rule has been challenged on various grounds in district
courts.111  A round of cases, transferred and consolidated in the D.C. district
104 Id. at 125.
105 Id. at 126.
106 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776
(2009); see Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act—An Overview, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/labeling/rulesregulationsguidance/
ucm246129.htm (last Jan. 17, 2018) [hereinafter TCA Overview].
107 TCA Overview, supra note 106.
108 Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Restrictions
on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for
Tobacco Products, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,973, 28,976 (May 10, 2016) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
1100) [hereinafter Deeming Rule]; see FDA’s Deeming Regulations for E-Cigarettes, Cigars, and
All Other Tobacco Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/tobaccoprod-
ucts/labeling/rulesregulationsguidance/ucm394909.htm#rule (last updated Nov. 25,
2019).
109 Deeming Rule, supra note 108.
110 The Facts on the FDA’s New Tobacco Rule, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm506676.htm (last updated June 16,
2016).
111 See, e.g., Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 266 F. Supp. 3d 360, 366, 368 (D.D.C. 2017)
(holding that the FDA’s Deeming Rule did not exceed its statutory authority nor did it
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court, challenge the Deeming Rule as violating the Appointments Clause:
Hoban v. FDA,112 Moose Jooce v. FDA,113 and Rave Salon Inc. v. FDA.114  The
plaintiffs, primarily manufacturers and retailers in the vaping industry, claim
that signing the Deeming Rule requires an officer and that the signatory here
was neither a principal nor inferior officer, thus violating the Appointments
Clause.115 They claim that the Deeming Rule is invalid because the FDA
employee who issued it was not lawfully vested with the authority to do so.116
Specifically at issue in this case is the status of the individual within the
FDA who issued the rule: Leslie Kux, the Associate Commissioner for Policy
(ACP) and Director of the Office of Policy in the Office of the Commissioner
at the FDA.117  According to the FDA’s website, at the time the rule was
issued, Ms. Kux “overs[aw], direct[ed], and coordinate[d] the agency’s
rulemaking activities and regulations development system, including process-
ing documents for publication in the Federal Register and initiating new sys-
tems and procedures to make the agency’s process more efficient.”118  Ms.
Kux was a career appointment to a senior executive service (SES) position.119
The FDA Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner appoint individuals to
SES positions subject to the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) Secretary’s concurrence.120  Accordingly, Ms. Kux was not hired pur-
suant to either of the modes of appointment sufficient for an inferior officer
violate the First Amendment); Commercial Tobacco Control Litigation—Case Summaries, PUB.
HEALTH L. CTR., https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/content/tobacco-control-act-
cases (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (providing summaries of numerous lawsuits relating to the
Deeming Rule).
112 Complaint, Hoban, supra note 3.
113 Complaint, Moose Jooce, supra note 3.
114 Complaint, Rave Salon Inc., supra note 3.
115 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Their Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 2, Moose Jooce v. FDA, No. 1:18-CV-00203 (D.D.C. May 2,
2019) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points].
116 See Ilya Shapiro, A Lawsuit to Make Rulemakers Follow the Rules, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb.
5, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/a-lawsuit-to-make-rulemakers-follow-the-
rules.
117 Meet Leslie Kux, Associate Commissioner for Policy, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/ucm304642.htm (last updated Mar. 27, 2018) [here-
inafter Meet Leslie Kux]; Deeming Rule, supra note 108, at 29,106.  Ms. Kux is no longer the
ACP, and, as of this publication, Lauren Roth is serving as the acting Associate Commis-
sioner for Policy. See Lauren Roth JD, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
about-fda/fda-organization/lauren-roth (last updated Apr. 22, 2019).  Changes in person-
nel following the Deeming Rule’s promulgation do not affect the analysis.
118 Meet Leslie Kux, supra note 117.
119 See COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV’T AFFAIRS, 114TH CONG., POLICY AND SUPPORT-
ING POSITIONS 70 (Comm. Print 2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/collection/plum-book?
path=/Gpo/United%20States%20Government%20Policy%20and%20Supporting%20Posi
tions%20(Plum%20Book)/2016 (providing the appointment of the Associate Commis-
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under the Appointments Clause: presidential appointment with Senate con-
firmation or appointment by a department head, court of law, or the Presi-
dent alone at Congress’s direction.121  The complaints characterize Ms. Kux
as exercising “the power to issue a final rule on one’s own authority” without
any procedure for a superior to review it.122  The FDA does not provide read-
ily available details about its internal rulemaking procedures.123  Reading the
final rule also sheds little light on the process of its promulgation.124  The
FDA Staff Manual Guide details the delegation and subdelegation of author-
ity from Congress to the HHS Secretary, from the Secretary to the Commis-
sioner of the FDA, and from the Commissioner to individuals within the
agency, including the Associate Commissioner of Policy.125  Section 1410.21
states that the Associate Commissioner for Policy, among other individuals, is
authorized to issue final regulations of the Food and Drug Administration.126
The guide also provides an overview of the functions of the Office of Policy,
including “[o]versee[ing], direct[ing], and coordinat[ing] the agency’s
rulemaking and guidance development activities.”127
The ACP’s constitutional status remains an open question, as Lucia only
addressed the officer standard as applied to SEC ALJs.128
B. Delegation and Subdelegation (and Sub-subdelegation) of Authority
It is a practical reality that, in the modern administrative state, Congress
cannot legislate in a manner that could account for all the details required in
the current expansive regulatory environment.  The solution to this is the
121 See 2 FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDE § 1431.23, supra note 119.
122 Complaint, Hoban, supra note 3, at 6, 12 (“[R]ather than exercising significant
authority under the laws of the United States pursuant to a valid officer’s commission, Ms.
Kux exercises this power pursuant to an unconstitutional delegation.”); Complaint, Rave
Salon, supra note 3, at 6, 12; Complaint, Moose Jooce, supra note 3, at 7, 12.
123 See FDA Rules and Regulations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/regu
latoryinformation/rulesregulations/default.htm (last updated May 7, 2019) (providing
only a general, textbook account of the rulemaking process); cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, GAO-09-205, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO MONITORING AND
EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY OF OMB REGULA-
TORY REVIEWS 7 (2009) (finding FDA is not forthcoming with information about internal
rulemaking processes).
124 See Deeming Rule, supra note 108.
125 2 FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDES §§ 1410.10, 1410.21 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffManualGuides/ucm136380.htm.
126 Id. § 1410.21(1)(G) (“[T]he Associate Commissioner for Policy . . . [is] authorized
. . . [t]o perform any of the functions of the Commissioner with respect to the issuance of
FR notices and proposed and final regulations of the Food and Drug Administration.”).
127 1 id. § 1118.6(1)(F) (2014).
128 See Seth Barrett Tillman & Josh Blackman, Is Robert Mueller an ‘Officer of the United
States’ or an ‘Employee of the United States’?, LAWFARE (July 23, 2018), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/robert-mueller-officer-united-states-or-employee-united-states (discussing how
“Lucia has unsettled what was previously settled case law”).  Consider the effect of doc-
trines like the de facto officer doctrine. See Gordon Stoner, Recovery of Salary by a De Facto
Officer, 10 MICH. L. REV. 178 (1912).
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delegation of some of its power to expert agencies to make those calls within
the guidelines Congress provides.
For the same reasons Congress delegates—to promote efficiency, effec-
tiveness, and expertise that would be impossible for the highest tier of gov-
ernance to achieve—agency heads must delegate authority to individuals
within their agencies.129  While the organic statute Congress passes may dele-
gate authority to an agency—or an agency head or board or commission—as
a practical matter, other actors not mentioned in the law exercise the dele-
gated authority.  Agency subdelegation is beyond the scope of the Appoint-
ments Clause cases up to this point, as those cases involved questions about
the status of officials operating in offices specified by Congress.  The process
of subdelegation, through which the heads of agencies pass on the authority
granted by Congress to their subordinates,130 adds complexity to the officer
question.
In this increasingly complex administrative world, with more delegation
of authority and commands to agencies to regulate from Congress, the sys-
tem would be unable to function effectively without the ability of agency
heads to delegate responsibilities within their respective bodies.131  The Con-
stitution contemplated the President would need heads of departments (and
thus departments) to execute the laws passed by Congress, and practical con-
siderations, such as the limited time and resources available to agency lead-
ers, show that those responsibilities must be further diffused throughout
those departments to actors other than those specifically granted the author-
ity.132  The implications of subdelegation depend on how the agency head
chooses to pass down authority.  She may choose to delegate final authority
to the subordinate, allowing the subordinate to sign off on a rule, for exam-
ple.  These have been called “final subdelegations.”133  Or she could keep for
herself the final authority by reviewing the subordinate’s work before signing
off on it—a “reviewable subdelegation.”134  There is also a difference
between formally subdelegated authority, as through a rule, and that which is
subdelegated simply in practice without any announcement by the agency or
process in conveying that authority.135  All this is to say that the question of
who is an officer—who exercises significant authority in a continuing office,
under Lucia—becomes more difficult when an agency official is lower in the
organizational chart.
129 Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 441 (2015).
130 See Jennifer Nou, Essay, Subdelegating Powers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 475 (2017).
131 Id. (“Delegation in some form, of course, is a necessity in large organizations like
bureaucracies.”).
132 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments . . . .”).
133 Nou, supra note 130, at 485.  Note that Lucia recently focused on the Freytag Court’s
rejection of finality as dispositive for significant authority, though it may still be considered
as a factor.  Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (2018) (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S.
868, 881 (1991)).
134 Nou, supra note 130, at 485.
135 See Nou, supra note 129, at 468.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL310.txt unknown Seq: 19 28-FEB-20 13:02
2020] can  a  “mere  employee”  stop  you  from  vaping? 1417
Subdelegation raises constitutional concerns when subordinate actors in
an agency exercise significant authority without being hired pursuant to one
of the constitutionally permissible modes for officers.136  Courts have held
that the Constitution constrains the ability of government actors to exercise
authority without sufficient political accountability, reading in requirements
regarding appointments and restrictions on removal.137  The response to this
concern is to focus on the internal control over the subordinate actor, as
more control allows broader delegated authority without compromising
political accountability.138  Mode of appointment is one method of control.
C. Applying Appointments Clause Frameworks to Rulemaking Officials
and the FDA Deeming Rule
When the actor at issue is involved in rulemaking rather than adjudica-
tion—the issue presented in the current Deeming Rule litigation—the law-
fulness of the rule turns on that actor’s constitutional status.  Is the employee
who issued the final rule really that—an employee?  Or is she an officer
because she exercised this final rulemaking authority?  Turning that premise
around, can it be said instead that, because she is not an officer, the rule she
issued was not valid because only an officer can exercise that significant
authority? Freytag suggested something along these lines, finding that an
officer who also performs tasks that a nonofficer employee could perform
does not change her status as an officer.  Accordingly, a mere employee can-
not exercise the authority of an officer without her status changing to that of
an officer.
As the Court’s Appointments Clause cases make clear, whether an indi-
vidual is an officer is a highly fact-specific inquiry.  For an individual issuing a
rule, such as Ms. Kux in the FDA, courts must inquire into the details of that
individual’s authority, tracing it from Congress to the agency, and from the
agency to this individual.139  They should also look at the modes through
which the individual exercises that authority and any checks on her power.140
Under the Lucia framework, the second prong of the analysis turns on
whether this individual exercised significant authority under the law.  Based
136 Nou, supra note 130, at 512 (“Subdelegation raises constitutional worries since
agency heads may entrust significant duties to subordinates with attenuated relationships
to the President.”).
137 Id. at 514. See generally Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
138 Nou, supra note 130, at 514.
139 See Jennifer Nou, The SEC’s Improper Subdelegation (Statutory, Not Constitutional), YALE
J. ON REG. BLOG (Apr. 11, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-secs-improper-subdelegation
-statutory-not-constitutional/.
140 See, e.g., Recommendation 95-4, Procedures for Noncontroversial and Expedited
Rulemaking, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,110, 42,112 (Aug. 18, 1995); Philip A. Wallach & Nicholas W.
Zeppos, Contestation of Direct Final Rules During the Trump Administration, BROOKINGS (Oct. 9,
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/contestation-of-direct-final-rules-during-the-
trump-administration/.
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on the precedent cases requiring a fact-based inquiry and the realities of
agency action, this Note proposes a factor-based approach to the question of
significant authority.  Relevant to the inquiry are the mode of subdelegation
to this individual (final or reviewable, formal or in practice); whether
another actor exercises control over this individual; and the nature of the
action itself. Freytag considered factors relevant to this analysis regarding
STJs.141  The Court has not yet had an opportunity to examine factors partic-
ular to the rulemaking context.
Applying the two-prong officer analysis from Lucia to the rulemaking
official who promulgated the FDA Deeming Rule, the first question is
whether the Associate Commissioner for Policy is a continuing position estab-
lished by law.  An apparently clear answer comes from the FDA Staff Manual
Guide, showing this is a continuing position, not temporary under United
States v. Germaine.142
The next prong under Lucia is whether the ACP exercises significant
authority.  As discussed in Part II, “significant authority” has more than one
possible definition, and it has not yet been settled by the Supreme Court.143
Under a broad definition of significant authority—exercising a statutory
duty—the ACP likely satisfies this prong.  The FDA Staff Manual Guide shows
that the delegation of statutory authority to issue rules flows from Congress to
the Secretary of HHS under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  That
authority is then delegated to the Commissioner of the FDA and further dele-
gated to the ACP.144
Under a narrower definition of significant authority, this Note suggests a
fact-specific inquiry including consideration of three factors: subdelegation
of authority; control over the individual by any other individual (including
review authority); and the nature of the action.
According to Buckley v. Valeo, “rulemaking . . . exercised free from day-to-
day supervision of either Congress or the Executive Branch . . . represents the
performance of a significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a pub-
lic law,” and “may therefore be exercised only by persons who are ‘Officers of
the United States.’”145  The level of supervision, then, is important in this
analysis of officer status in rulemaking.146
In the case of the Deeming Rule, the Secretary of HHS from the begin-
ning reserves the right to review.  However, the ability to review does not
diminish the ability of the ACP to issue a final rule in several instances, when-
ever the Secretary does not choose to review.  The final authority of the FDA
141 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991) (finding STJs exercise significant
authority in part because they perform “important functions” with “significant discretion”).
142 See 2 FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDES § 1410.21, supra note 125; United States v. Ger-
maine, 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1879); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points, supra note 115, at 15.
143 See supra Part II.
144 2 FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDES §§ 1410.10, 1410.21, supra note 125.
145 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140–41 (1976) (per curiam) (footnotes omitted).
146 Cf. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (1997) (describing supervision in
deciding the principal versus inferior officer issue).
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Commissioner has been subdelegated to the ACP, with only the restriction
that it may not be further delegated beyond her.147  As stated earlier, the
particulars of the FDA’s internal rulemaking process are not readily available
to discern possible functional restrictions and control exercised over this
individual that could affect the analysis.  Finally, the nature of the action is
issuing a final rule.  Issuing a rule alters the legal rights and obligations of the
public and the government. Buckley v. Valeo listed rulemaking as an example
of an exercise of significant authority.  Under this analysis, the FDA ACP
likely exercised significant authority.
Under the broad and narrow definitions of statutory authority consid-
ered here, the ACP, by issuing a final rule, performed the role of an officer of
the United States.  Under the original meaning definition of officer offered
by Professor Mascott,148 the significant authority language drops out com-
pletely, and the question becomes whether the ACP exercises a continuing,
statutory duty.  Similar to the broad definition of significant authority, under
this test, the role of ACP is a continuing position under statute.  Therefore,
the ACP is an officer under the original meaning definition and must be
hired pursuant to the Appointments Clause.
As discussed above, the FDA Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner
appoint the ACP.  The FDA is an agency within the Department of HHS.  It is
not a department itself.  The Supreme Court has found that “the term
‘Heads of Departments’ does not embrace ‘inferior commissioners and
bureau officers.’”149  The “concurrence of the Secretary” language150 could
complicate the question.  As it stands, it seems likely that the ACP was not
appointed by a head of department.  If the above is true, it would follow that
Ms. Kux was not appointed pursuant to one of the constitutionally required
modes, so a court might find that the Deeming Rule was issued in violation of
the Constitution.
D. Implications
When an agency loses on a procedural step and not a substantive one, it
can simply issue the rule again following the proper process.  Although a
plaintiff may win the battle, the agency will win the war.  However, there are
functional stakes to be considered.  A court challenge and invalidation of an
agency’s rule takes precious time from an administration working to issue
rules—to make and execute policies that the President was elected to do—
during a brief four years (sometimes eight).  A loss after a long court chal-
lenge may result in the frustration of real policy gains that rules are meant to
147 2 FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDES § 1410.21, supra note 125.
148 See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
149 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886 (1991) (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. 508, 511 (1879)).
150 2 FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDE § 1431.23, supra note 119, at 1.
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affect.  Consequences will also follow a finding that a vast number of rules
were promulgated by unconstitutionally appointed officers.151
The other area that has consequences on the functioning of agencies is
the Free Enterprise Fund holding that having multiple levels of removal protec-
tion is unconstitutional.  In his Lucia dissent, Justice Breyer explained the
potential difficulties presented in the ALJ context, where independence is
important to the legitimacy and fairness of proceedings, and in practice, this
would evoke a potentially disastrous upheaval of the current structure of
agencies.  The same concerns may apply in the rulemaking context.  A
broader definition of officer will encompass far more individuals further
down the chain of command within agencies.  Less rides on the indepen-
dence of agency rulemaking officials than for ALJs, but there may be even
more concern about the structural disruption.
Despite these concerns, there are countervailing purposes that support
strict adherence to the text and doctrine of the Appointments Clause—stakes
in following the formalities of the Constitution in protection of the proper
balance of powers.  The formality of the clearly defined modes of appoint-
ment acts as a structural safeguard.  This fills several purposes.  It protects
against one branch unilaterally taking on more power by creating and filling
an office by itself.  It keeps the power of appointment in the current bal-
ance—it will not let too much power move from the President and to Con-
gress.  It also requires that the executive branch remain accountable for its
officers, which can lead to more qualified officers being nominated.152  The
originalist view that Justice Thomas supported in his Lucia concurrence
stands for the promotion of increased accountability because specifying the
few people who can appoint officers makes even clearer the lines of account-
ability and encourages those people to make good appointments.153  It
guards against encroachment of one branch into another’s power by prevent-
ing diffusion of the appointment power.154  It can be argued that mere
employees could also cause problems for private citizens with the power they
exercise, so why does a more robust appointments doctrine protect those
citizens?155  A broader conception of “officer” means that more individuals
acting with the authority to bind the government and the public will be sub-
ject to the check provided by the Appointments Clause.  The formality of the
Appointments Clause requires more careful consideration by Congress
before creating officer positions and greater accountability of the President
over the conduct of all officers.
151 See ANGELA C. ERICKSON & THOMAS BERRY, PACIFIC LEGAL FOUND., BUT WHO RULES
THE RULEMAKERS?: A STUDY OF ILLEGALLY ISSUED REGULATIONS AT HHS 25 tbl.1 (2019)
(finding that Ms. Kux, as ACP, was the sole signer of 385 rules during the study period).
152 Plecnik, supra note 6, at 210.
153 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
154 See Brief for Pac. Legal Found, supra note 84, at 25 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at
878).
155 As the Pacific Legal Fund put it: “Cannot ‘swarms’ of ‘mere’ employees harass the
people and eat out their substance with less than significant authority?” Id. at 25.
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CONCLUSION
When it comes to the exercise of agency rulemaking authority, the
appointment of the individual issuing the final rule matters.  Formal adher-
ence to the mandates of the Appointments Clause—properly applied to the
rulemaking context—protects the separation of powers among the branches
and enables the public to keep policymakers accountable for their actions.
Lucia provided a two-prong analysis but left the definition of “significant
authority” unsettled.  If the Court follows Justice Thomas and the original
meaning definition, it could mean a reformulation of the Appointments
Clause doctrine entirely, defining “officer” as one exercising a continuous,
statutory duty.  If it springs off of the two prongs from Lucia, the definition of
“significant authority” may be broad or narrow.  Under the broad definition,
an officer performs a statutory duty in accordance with the original public
meaning.  Under the narrow definition, the standard for significant authority
requires a more searching factual inquiry into the individual’s role.
Regardless of which definition prevails, the analysis should promote the
values safeguarded by the Appointments Clause—accountability of the politi-
cal bodies for the actions of those working within them and formal distinc-
tions among the powers of the branches of government.  These can be
accomplished by considering factors that account for the complexity of
agency action in the rulemaking context.  The factors include how authority
was subdelegated to the individual in question, the degree of control exer-
cised over the individual, and the nature of the action.  Applying these fac-
tors to the officer who promulgated the final FDA Deeming Rule, one can
determine whether the individual who signed off on the rule was a “mere
employee,” making her actions unconstitutional under the Appointments
Clause.
Following Lucia, the question remains as to how the Appointments
Clause applies to agency decisionmakers who are not ALJs.  Whether through
the Deeming Rule litigation or another court challenge to an individual
wielding the agency’s authority, the Court will be confronted again with the
question of who is an officer of the United States.
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